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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State charged Amy Faye Greco with possession of a controlled substance 
and injury to a child. Ms. Greco moved to suppress all of the evidence found during the 
execution of a search warrant, contending that there had been an illegal warrantless 
entry prior to obtaining the warrant and the warrant lacked the proper indicia of reliability 
and facts to support probable cause. After a hearing on the matter, the district court 
granted the suppression motion. The State appealed. Ms. Greco contends the district 
court correctly suppressed the evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The prosecuting attorney charged Ms. Greco by Information with the crimes of 
possession of a controlled substance and injury to children. (R., pp.22-23.) Ms. Greco 
filed a suppression motion alleging that her constitutional rights under both the United 
States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution were violated requiring suppression of 
evidence obtained by the police. (R., pp.35-40.) After the district court rejected a 
written Rule 11 plea agreement (R., p.51), the State objected to the suppression motion 
(R., pp.53-62). The State argued that Ms, Greco gave consent for the police officers to 
enter the residence (R., pp.55-57); exigent circumstances existed to enter Ms. Greco's 
bedroom (R., pp.57-60); the officers had lawful authority to conduct a protective sweep 
and secure the premises to obtain a search warrant (R, pp.60-61 ); and, sufficient 
attenuation existed to constitute independent probable cause for issuance of a search 
warrant (R., p.61 ). 
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The district court conducted a hearing and took the matter under advisement. 
(R, pp.73-74.) The district court found the relevant facts to be as followed: 
Approximately two weeks prior to September 16, 2010, Wilder law 
enforcement received information from a relative of the defendant named 
"Mel" regarding possible drug activity at the residence located at 611 
Mitchell in Wilder, Idaho. Mel called law enforcement to report frequent 
traffic coming and going from the residence. He also advised that the 
defendant had set up video monitors to view the perimeter of the house. 
Mel also had concerns that the defendant's grandmother, who resides at 
the same location, was having her cancer medication taken from her. Law 
enforcement observed vehicles come and go from the residence for the 
preceding week. 
Chief Tveidt received information from the principal of Wilder 
Elementary School that the defendant's son had been using marijuana. 
The same information also came from another child that had been 
removed from his home by Health and Welfare. Tveidt spoke with 
defendant's son and he admitted to smoking marijuana and that he had a 
bong in his bedroom. The defendant's son told Tveidt that people come 
and go and stay for short periods of time in his mother's room. 
Chief Tveidt traveled to the subject residence. The defendant's 
grandmother answered the door. The defendant then stepped outside the 
residence to talk with Tveidt. The defendant consented to the search of 
her son's room. Tveidt then asked to search the whole house. The 
defendant did not consent and indicated that she needed to ask her 
grandmother for consent to search. The defendant walked into the house. 
Tveidt followed her inside without invitation. After entering the house the 
defendant went into her room and closed the door. Tveidt heard clanging 
glass and thought the defendant was destroying evidence so he ordered 
the defendant out of her room and then detained the defendant and a 
man, who was in her room, so law enforcement could obtain a search 
warrant. Tveidt entered into the defendant's room to check on the infant 
that was in the room, and at that point he saw the video monitor she had 
set up to view the perimeter of the house. The monitor displayed Wilder 
patrol vehicles parked on the street in front of the residence. 
Chief Tveidt then obtained a search warrant from Magistrate Judge 
Frates, executed it, and law enforcement found methamphetamine, 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. On October 4, 2010, an arrest warrant 
was issued for defendant and she was subsequently arrested for 
Possession Of Methamphetamine and Injury to Child. 
(R., pp.80-81 (citations to Search Warrant Transcript omitted).) 
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The court concluded that entry by the officers into the home violated Ms. Greco's 
constitutional rights because the officers lacked Ms. Greco's consent to enter the home. 
(R., pp.83-86.) Moreover, the court concluded that "had the officers not been in the 
home illegally, they would not have seen or heard what they believed was evidence of a 
crime." (R., p.88.) Therefore, because law enforcement created the exigency by their 
uninvited entry into the home, the State was precluded from relying on the exception to 
the warrant requirement. (R., pp.86-88.) Likewise, the officers could not justify a 
protective sweep by entering into Ms. Greco's bedroom because they were unlawfully in 
the home. (R., pp.88-89.) Finally, the district court concluded that the search warrant 
was improperly issued because the hearsay statements of Mel and Ms. Greco's son 
were unreliable, and Chief Tveidt failed to disclose to the magistrate that he entered the 
house without consent and included information that was improperly obtained. 
(R., pp.89-92.) 
The State filed an appeal from the district court's Decision on Motion to 
Suppress. (R., pp.97-100.) 
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ISSUE 
Has the State failed to show the district court's order granting Ms. Greco's motion to 
suppress was in error? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The State Failed To Show The District Court's Order Granting Ms. Greco's Motion To 
Suppress Was In Error 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Greco submits that the district court was correct in granting her motion to 
suppress because her constitutional rights were violated. The State seeks reversal of 
the district court's decision. However, a review of the record and applicable case law 
supports the district court's order granting Ms. Greco's motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 
336, 338 (Ct. App. 2003). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence are accepted; 
however, the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found are freely 
reviewed. State v. McCall, 135 Idaho 885, 886 (2001 ). At a suppression hearing, the 
power to assess the credibility of all witnesses, weigh evidence, resolve factual conflicts 
and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 
Idaho 102, 106 (1995). The State bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove that 
the challenged evidence is untainted by the police misconduct. State v. McBaine, 144 
Idaho 130, 133 (Ct App. 2007). 
C. The State Has Failed To Show That The District Court's Order Granting 
Ms. Greco's Motion To Suppress Was In Error 
The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
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U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const Art I, § 17. "Warrantless searches are 
presumptively unreasonable and the State bears the burden to demonstrate that a 
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances." State v. Martinez, 
129 Idaho 426, 431 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted). The United States Supreme 
Court has held that when evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
the judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal 
proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 
340, 347 (1987) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383 (1914)). 
After a hearing on the matter, the district court concluded that entry by the 
officers into the home violated Ms. Greco's constitutional rights because they lacked 
Ms. Greco's consent to enter the home. (R., pp.83-86.) Moreover, the court concluded 
that "had the officers not been in the home illegally, they would not have seen or heard 
what they believed was evidence of a crime." (R., p.88.) Therefore, because law 
enforcement created the exigency by their uninvited entry into the home, the State was 
precluded from relying on this exception to the warrant requirement (R., pp.86-88.) 
Likewise, the officers could not justify a protective sweep by entering into Ms. Greco's 
bedroom because they were unlawfully in the home. (R., pp.88-89.) Finally, the district 
court concluded that the search warrant was improperly issued because the hearsay 
statements of Mel and Ms. Greco's son were unreliable and Chief Tveidt failed to 
disclose to the magistrate that he entered the house without consent and included 
information that was improperly obtained. (R., pp.89-92.) 
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The State asserts that the district court erred when it determined that the officers 
entered the home without Ms. Greco's consent. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-6.) Because 
the officers were lawfully in the house, the State contends that exigent circumstances 
existed allowing their entry into Ms. Greco's room. (Appellant's Brief, pp.6-7.) Finally, 
the State argues that the search warrant application established probable cause even in 
the absence of evidence found after their unlawful entry into the house. (R., pp.7-10.) 
Ms. Greco asserts the State is incorrect. 
1. The District Court Correctly Determined That Ms. Greco Did Not Give The 
Officers Consent To Enter The Home 
"Voluntary consent to search from a person who has actual authority to so 
consent obviates the need for a warrant." State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 862 (Ct. App. 
2001) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); State v. Johnson, 110 
Idaho 516,522 (1986); State v. Ham, 113 Idaho 405,406 (Ct. App. 1987). '"The burden 
is upon the state to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's ... 
consent to search was given freely and voluntarily . . . . [T]he voluntariness of a 
consent to search must be determined from the totality of the circumstances."' Id. 
(citing State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 749 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Aitken, 121 
Idaho 783, 784 (Ct. App. 1992))). 
The district court found that Ms. Greco did not consent to entry of the home. 
(R., p.80.) The State does not contest the district court's factual findings. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.5-6.) The district court found the following relevant facts after listening to 
testimony and hearing arguments, 
The defendant's grandmother answered the door. The defendant then 
stepped outside the residence to talk with Tveidt. The defendant 
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consented to the search of her son's room. Tveidt then asked to search 
the whole house. The defendant did not consent and indicated that she 
needed to ask her grandmother for consent to search. The defendant 
walked into the house. Tveidt followed her inside without invitation. 
(R., p.79.) 
The instant case is very similar to State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707 (Ct. App. 
1998). The Abeyta Court recognized that when a person retreats into their home to get 
something and leaves the door open, that is not an invitation for police to enter. 
Abeyta's subsequent consent for further entry into the residence and to search, 
however, cured the unlawful entry. Id. at 708. 
When Chief Tveidt followed Ms. Greco inside, he did so without consent He 
entered the house without a warrant and without a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement. The State possessed the burden of proof and it failed to meet its burden 
before the district court. This Court should affirm the district court's decision to 
suppress the evidence because the police unlawfully entered Ms. Greco's home. 
2. The District Court Correctly Determined That Exigent Circumstances Did 
Not Justify Entry Into Ms. Greco Room Because The Police Officers Were 
Unlawfully In The Home 
The district court concluded that because law enforcement created the exigency 
by their uninvited entry into the home, the State was precluded from relying on the 
exception to the warrant requirement (R., pp.86-88.) The State argues that because 
the entry was lawful, exigent circumstances exception should apply. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp.6-7.) Ms. Greco contends the district court correctly decided the issue. 
"[P]revent[ing] the imminent destruction of evidence" has long been 
recognized as a sufficient justification for a warrantless search. 
Over the years, lower courts have developed an exception to the 
exigent circumstances rule, the so-called "police-created exigency" 
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doctrine. Under this doctrine, police may not rely on the need to prevent 
destruction of evidence when that exigency was "created" or 
"manufactured" by the conduct of the police. 
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct 1849, 1856-57 (2011) (citations omitted). Because the 
State unlawfully entered the home, the exigency exception does not apply. 
3. The District Court Correctly Determined That The Search Warrant 
Application Did Not Establish Probable Cause 
The State asserts that even in the absence of the evidence found in violation of 
Ms. Greco's constitutional rights, the search warrant application established probable 
cause. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-10.) The district court correctly decided that the State 
failed to meet its burden of proof to obtain the search warrant (R., pp.89-92.) 
In determining the validity of a search warrant whose underlying 
application contains illegally obtained information, the ultimate question is 
whether "the remaining information presented to the magistrate, after the 
tainted evidence is excluded, contains adequate facts from which the 
magistrate could have concluded that probable cause existed for the 
issuance of the search warrant." Doe v. State, 131 Idaho 851, 853, 965 
P2d 816, 818 (1998) (quoting State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224, 228, 923 
P.2d 469,473 (Ct.App.1996)); see also State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 
526, 716 P.2d 1288, 1298 (1986). Additionally, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that in determining the validity of a search 
warrant "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, 
common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983); see 
also State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562 (1983). 
Furthermore, "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a substantial basis for ... concluding that probable cause 
existed." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332, 76 LEd.2d at 548; 
Lang, 105 Idaho at 684, 672 P.2d 561. 
State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 779 (1999). 
In certain exceptional instances, an affidavit containing such hearsay on 
hearsay will withstand attack. To do so, facts indicating: (1) The reliability 
of the initial source and the sufficiency of the supporting circumstances as 
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to the existence of probable cause; and (2) The reliability of the source of 
the information to the affiant, must be placed in the affidavit so that the 
magistrate may make his determination of probable cause. 
State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho 387, 391 (1976) 
In the instant case, the district court correctly decided that after removing the 
improper evidence included in the search warrant, probable cause did not exist to 
believe evidence of a crime would have been discovered in Ms. Greco's bedroom. 
Chief Tveidt provided testimony to the magistrate and the transcript has been 
augmented into the record for review of whether the magistrate would have possessed 
probable cause after the tainted evidence had been removed. (Order Granting Motion 
to Augment the Record, dated June 28, 2012; hereinafter Transcript for Search 
Warrant.) 
Chief Tveidt informed the magistrate that he received information from Mel, an 
alleged family member to Ms. Greco. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.3, Ls.20-24.) At 
first, Chief Tvedit claimed Mel resided at the residence with Ms. Greco (Transcript for 
Search Warrant, p.3, Ls.21-22), then he asserted that Mel lived in Middleton (Transcript 
for Search Warrant, p.3, Ls.23-24 ). Then he later revealed that it is Mel's wife that has 
most of the information and that she is the one that visits Ms. Greco's house more 
regularly. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.4, L.24-p.5, L.2.) Chief Tveidt did not 
speak with Mel's wife. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.5, Ls.1-2.) Mel reported that 
there is a concern that Ms. Greco may be selling her grandmother's cancer medication 
and they believe there are visitors coming to the house to purchase narcotics. 
(Transcript for Search Warrant, p.4, Ls.7-18.) Additionally, after receiving reports from a 
school principal about Ms. Greco's son's potential marijuana use, Chief Tveidt 
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interviewed the child at the school. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.6, L.14.) 
Ms. Greco's son admitted that he smoked marijuana and that he had a bong in his 
bedroom. (Transcript for Search Warrant, p.6, Ls.17-19.) The child also stated that his 
mom has visitors that come over to the house for a short period of time. (Transcript for 
Search Warrant, p.6, Ls.17-19.) Under the totality of the circumstances, the magistrate 
lacked probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be located in any place 
other than the child's bedroom. The district court judge correctly concluded that the 
magistrate judge lacked probable cause for issuance of a search warrant for the entire 
house. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Greco respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's Decision 
on Motion to Suppress, 
DATED this 21 st day of September, 2012. 
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DIANE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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